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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of a bidding firm’s geographical location on the choice of 
method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. We find that rural bidders are more likely to 
offer pure stock deals and have lower propensity to use cash as the method of payment 
compared to their non-rural counterparts. Such findings are possibly attributable to recent 
empirical evidence which finds that rural firms face higher costs of debt and have limited 
access to soft information that can help in determining the true value of target firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research examines the effect of firms’ geographical location on corporate 
financial decisions such as corporate debt characteristics, payout policy and mergers and 
acquisitions. Arena and Dewally (2012) provides evidence that the cost of debt is higher for 
remotely located firms because of the informational weakness and limited relationships with 
better financial intermediations in the corporate debt market. In the same vein, John, 
Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2011) find that rural firms adopt paying higher regular dividends as 
an instrument to alleviate the agency conflicts between firm managers and shareholders as 
farther distances usually lead to the difficulty of regulating and higher monitoring costs for 
shareholders. For studies on mergers and acquisitions, Cai and Tian (2013) investigate the 
impact of a target firm’s location on its corporate takeover exposure. They suggest that urban 
target firms are more likely to receive a takeover deal and with higher transaction 
completions than non-urban target firms. From the bidder side, Uysal, Kedia and 
Panchapagesan (2008) examine the location effect and bidder returns and find that closer 
distances between target and acquiring firms bring higher overall returns, especially for 
bidder returns in local deals which are almost double when compared with non-local deals. 
The spirit of this paper is to provide the first empirical investigation of the impact of 
bidding firms’ geographic location on influencing merger characteristics such as the choice of 
payment methods. As discussed above, although the relationship between firm location and 
terms of mergers has received growing attention in recent literature, there is no clear evidence 
to show whether bidding firms’ own geographic location may affect merger characteristics. 
In fact, the choice of payment method is strongly determined by a bidder’s debt capacity, 
cash financed deals could be a signal of new debt issuance whereas the objective of an equity 
financed deal is to mitigate the information asymmetry problem from the bidder side (e.g. 
Hansen, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Matos and Mergulhao, 
2012).  
Our study sheds light on the growing literature on investigating factors that may 
influence the decision of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. That is, building upon 
the information hypothesis that rural firms have limited access to soft information, are not as 
well-recognized by professional investors, and bear higher costs of debt (e.g. Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999; Loughran and Schultz, 2005; Loughran, 2008), they are less likely to use 
cash financing in a merger deal compared to their non-rural counterparts.  
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2. Data and methodology 
We establish our initial sample of US corporate acquisitions over the period 1998-2010 
from the Thomson One Banker Mergers and Acquisitions database. We exclude firms in both 
financial (SIC code 6000-6999) and utility industries (SIC code 4000-4999). We require 
bidding firms are publicly listed whereas target firms are either private or public companies. 
The original sample consists of 20,333 deals. We further remove (i) unsuccessful deals over 
the sample period 1998-2010, (ii) deal values less than $1 million, (iii) deals where bidding 
firms own more than 10% of a target’s shares prior to transaction and the seeking percentage 
of holding target shares after the transaction is less than 50%, (iv) deals described as 
bankruptcy acquisitions, divestitures, going private, leveraged buyouts, repurchases, 
restructurings and reverse takeovers, (v) deals without detailed information on the payment 
method composition from Thomson One Banker, and (vi) deals where information pertaining 
to firms’ fundamentals and their headquarters could not be found in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database. Overall, after removing the aforementioned deals, we are left with 5,334 
deals involving 2,520 public bidding firms. 
Following John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2011) and Arena and Dewally (2012), we 
retrieve location information for each firm’s headquarters from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT 
merged database. We then gather the longitude and latitude for each bidding firm and 
calculate the physical distance between bidding firms’ headquarters and every metropolitan 
area based on the 2000 US census: 
                                           (1)                                           
                 (2) 
where lat and lon are latitudes and longitudes, respectively, and r is the radius of the earth, 
which is 6378 km. 
A rural firm is classified as such if its distance is larger than 100 miles from any of the 
49 metropolitan areas shown in 2000 US census. The remaining bidding firms are categorized 
as non-rural firms. On average, rural firms included in our merger sample are 524.18 miles 
away from the closet top 10 largest metropolitan cities such as New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago, Washington-Baltimore, San Francisco, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Dallas and 
Houston.  
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Figure 1 presents the deal distribution according to the geographical category of our 
sample. The map shows the rural and non-rural areas based on the population distribution as 
most metropolitan cities are located in the west and east coasts and upper Midwest of the US, 
whereas most rural deals occurred in California, Nebraska, Missouri, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Iowa and Arkansas.  
 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Our first empirical model is to estimate the percentage of cash or stock used in merger 
deals on the rural measurements and other control variables that may affect the choice of 
payment method. As shown by its definition, the distribution of our dependent variable is 
positively skewed, which is located within the interval [0,100]. We then adopt the Tobit 
regression in investigating the general relationship between rural acquiring firms and cash 
payment fraction:  
  
                                                   (3) 
                          (4) 
where  is the variable that indicates firm’s location.  stands for the 
 control variable which is expected to affect the percentage of cash payment , and  is 
the total number of control variables. We also perform the same model for detecting the 
relationship between rural bidding firms and percentage of stock used in acquiring target 
firms. Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentages of methods of payment in our sample.  
 
[PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Our second regression model analyzes the choice of payment as measured by dummy 
variables (cash or stock dominating) and we use a Probit model to examine a particular 
likelihood of rural bidding firms in selecting one of the specific payment method in the 
merger process: 
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                          (5) 
where  is the variable that indicates firm’s location.  stands for the 
 control variable, and  is now the indicator variable that equals 1 if the composition of 
payment method is structured by more than 50% cash and 0 otherwise. Besides the cash 
dominating variable, we also examine the impact of firm location on the choice of paying 
pure cash as the medium of exchange in merger deals. Same models are also applied in 
testing the rural effects on the method of payment such as stock dominating and pure stock. 
 
3. Empirical results  
Estimation results in Table 1 show rural bidders pay fewer proportions of cash in buying 
target firms. This finding could be explained through the research by Arena and Dewally 
(2012) as they report rural firms face higher costs of debt and thus the percentage of cash as 
the composition of payment method of rural bidders is lower than that of non-rural bidders. In 
contrast, according to the information asymmetry hypothesis of equity financing deals (e.g. 
Fishman, 1989; Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel, 1990), the significant positive relationship 
between the rural proxy and the percentage of stock suggests rural bidders behave cautiously 
since equity offers provide better protection because now bidders share the post-merger risk 
with the shareholders. This is now advantageous to the bidder since, as mentioned earlier, 
rural bidders have less access to soft information pertaining to the target. 
 We further introduce the alternative rural measurements in testing the robustness of our 
estimating results. That is, we adopt the physical distance between a bidding firm’s 
headquarter and the nearest top 10 and top 49 ranked US metropolitan areas based on 2000 
US census, respectively. Similar findings have been emerged as farther the distance of 
bidding firms from either the top 10 or top 49 metropolitan areas, the higher the proportion of 
securities used as the payment method component.  
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 2 shows additional regression results for the likelihood of adopting cash or stock as 
the payment option when bidders are remotely located. Models (1) to (6) in Table 2 provide 
similar evidence as shown in Table 1, suggesting that a rural bidder is more likely to offer a 
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merger deal with stock dominating the payment method. An interesting finding that emerges 
is that rural bidders are more likely to acquire target firms by means of providing pure stock-
financed offers. This can be explained as follows. Firstly, rural firms are strongly reluctant to 
endure the cost of overpayment based on pure cash-financed deals. Secondly, regarding the 
narrow channel in obtaining the essential soft information to better understand the target, 
rural bidders with pure stock payment could enjoy a state-contingent benefit when comparing 
with the fact that cash payment is irrelevant with the profitability of the merger. Again, 
results from the ordered Probit regression in models (13) to (15) show additional evidence 
that remotely located firms are less likely to use cash as the means of payment in merger 
deals. 
 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4. Conclusion 
Using a merger sample consisting of 5,334 deals over the period 1998-2010, we find that 
firm geographic location does affect the choice of method of payment in acquisitions. In 
particular, rural bidders are more likely to purchase target firms through stock offers and they 
distribute a higher proportion of stock to finance the merger. Two reasonable interpretations 
that support our research findings are that remotely located firms have limited access to soft 
information in estimating the true value of targets and with lower debt capacity given their 
relatively high debt yield spreads (e.g. Fishman, 1989; Martin, 1996; Arena and Dewally, 
2012). Through providing further evidence on how firm location could affect corporate 
investment and financial decisions, our findings suggest that future research studies should 
consider firm location as an important factor that will affect the decision of payment method 
in mergers and acquisitions. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Payment Method Variables 
Percent of cash 
Percentage of cash as adopted by the bidder in acquiring the target firm from Thomson 
One Banker.  
Percent of stock 
Percentage of stock as adopted by the bidder in acquiring the target firms from Thomson 
One Banker. 
Cash  
dominating 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the weight of cash usage is more than 50% of the total 
payment composition and 0 otherwise. 
Stock 
dominating 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the weight of stock usage is more than 50% of the total 
payment composition and 0 otherwise. 
Pure cash A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is 100% paid by cash and 0 otherwise. 
Pure stock A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is 100% paid by stock and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Main Variables of Interest 
Rural Indicator equal to 1 when the bidder is located in a rural area and 0 otherwise.  
Top 10 distance 
The geographic distance between a bidder’s headquarters and the nearest top 10 ranked US 
metropolitan areas based on 2000 US census.  
Top 49 distance 
The geographic distance between a bidder’s headquarters and the nearest top 49 ranked US 
metropolitan areas based on 2000 US census.  
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Deal Size The value of deals (in $millions) as reported by Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if bidders and targets are located in the same industry and 0 
for intra-industry deals. The definition of inter- and intra-industry is based on the 2-digit 
SIC code from Thomson One Banker.  
Private deal 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for private target firms and 0 for public target firms from 
Thomson One Banker. 
Tender offer 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if deals are described as tender offers by Thomson One 
Banker and 0 otherwise.  
Panel D: Bidder Characteristics 
Size The logarithm of book value of total assets (COMPUSTAT item 6).  
ROA 
The ratio of the operating income before depreciation (COMPUSTAT item 13) to the total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item 6). 
Tobin's Q 
The logarithm of the ratio of market value of assets over book value of assets: 
(COMPUSTAT item 6-COMPUSTAT item 60+COMPUSTAT item 25*COMPUSTAT 
item 199)/(COMPUSTAT item 6).  
Leverage 
Book value of debts (COMPUSTAT item 34+ COMPUSTAT item 9) over book value of 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item 6). 
Cash 
The ratio of cash and short-term investments (COMPUSTAT item 1) to book value of total 
assets (COMPUSTAT item 6).  
Rating missing 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if there is no specific credit rating for bidders and 0 for 
bidders with a credit rating.  
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Figure 1.  Geographical distribution of merger and acquisition deals 
This figure presents a map of the deal distribution of rural and non-rural areas in the United States over 
the period 1998-2010. Following Loughran and Schulz (2005) and Arena and Dewally (2012), we define 
rural bidders as those bidding firms that are more than 100 miles from any of the top 49 US metropolitan 
areas as shown in the 2000 census. Each deal is shown as a plotted point within the location of a 
particular bidder.  Areas with darker shadings are non-rural areas and the darkest shading is for the area 
with the highest population in the 2000 census.  
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Figure 2.  The distribution of payment method  
This figure shows the distribution of the percentage of cash and stock used in the merger sample of 5334 
deals over the period 1998-2010. All the detail information is gathered from the Thomson One Banker 
Mergers and Acquisitions database.  
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Table 1. Tobit regressions of payment methods on firm geographical location 
This table presents estimation results through Tobit regressions of payment method on corporate geographical location. 
The merger sample consists of 5334 deals in the United States over the period 1998-2010. Models (1) to (3) refer to Tobit 
regressions with percent of cash as the dependent variable. Models (4) to (6) are Tobit regressions with percent of stock 
as the dependent variable. T-statistics based on standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity and provided in 
parentheses.  Definitions of variables are discussed in the Appendix. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
  Percent of cash    Percent of stock  
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Rural  
-0.1566** 
   
0.1734* 
  
(-1.99) 
   
(1.77) 
  
Top 10 distance  
-0.0788** 
   
0.0918** 
 
 
(-2.05) 
   
(1.96) 
 
Top 49 distance   
-0.0737* 
   
0.0909* 
  
(-1.79) 
   
(1.78) 
Firm size 
0.0174 0.0136 0.0151 
 
-0.0049 0.0074 0.0059 
(0.64) (0.43) (0.48) 
 
(-0.14) (0.18) (0.14) 
Return on 
assets 
0.1526** 0.2484** 0.2469** 
 
-0.1560* -0.2571** -0.2553** 
(2.15) (2.51) (2.50) 
 
(-1.66) (-1.98) (-1.97) 
Tobin's Q 
0.0868 0.1072 0.1076 
 
-0.0856 -0.1315 -0.1321 
(1.43) (1.53) (1.54) 
 
(-1.12) (-1.47) (-1.47) 
Leverage 
0.0208 -0.0886 -0.0887 
 
0.0031 0.1655 0.1657 
(0.24) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
 
(0.03) (1.31) (1.31) 
Cash  
0.1409 0.1850* 0.1895* 
 
-0.1329 -0.2009 -0.2060 
(1.56) (1.73) (1.77) 
 
(-1.17) (-1.46) (-1.50) 
Rating missing 
-0.0572 -0.0728 -0.0714 
 
0.0942 0.1205 0.1194 
(-1.08) (-1.15) (-1.13) 
 
(1.41) (1.48) (1.46) 
Diversification  
0.0604* 0.0465 0.0460 
 
-0.0637 -0.0401 -0.0395 
(1.65) (1.07) (1.06) 
 
(-1.38) (-0.72) (-0.71) 
Deal size 
-0.0330*** -0.0282** -0.0283** 
 
0.0438*** 0.0407** 0.0408** 
(-3.09) (-2.19) (-2.20) 
 
(3.28) (2.49) (2.49) 
Private deal 
0.4566*** 0.4746*** 0.4745*** 
 
-0.6500*** -0.6816*** -0.6816*** 
(8.79) (7.71) (7.71) 
 
(-10.11) (-8.74) (-8.74) 
Tender offer 
1.4642*** 1.4686*** 1.4695*** 
 
-2.0554*** -2.1120*** -2.1128*** 
(15.90) (13.14) (13.14) 
 
(-15.58) (-12.83) (-12.83) 
Constant 
0.1663 0.1281 0.1202 
 
0.4962*** 0.5167*** 0.5251*** 
(1.30) (0.84) (0.79) 
 
(3.09) (2.65) (2.70) 
        
Pseudo R2 0.0318 0.0308 0.0306 
 
0.0370 0.0365 0.0365 
Obs. 5334 5334 5334 
 
5334 5334 5334 
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Table 2. Probit regressions of payment methods on firm geographical location 
This table presents estimation results through Probit regressions of payment method on corporate geographical location. The merger sample consists of 5,334 deals in the 
United States over the period 1998-2010. Models (1) to (6) refer to Probit regressions with cash dominating and stock dominating as dependent variables, respectively. 
Models (7) to (12) are Probit regressions with pure cash and pure stock as dependent variables, respectively. The estimation results of ordered Probit regressions are shown 
in Models (13) to (15), where the dependent variable is equal to 2 for all pure cash deals, 1 for mixed deals, and 0 for all pure stock deals. T-statistics based on standard 
errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity are provided in parentheses. Definitions of variables are discussed in the Appendix. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  Cash dominating   Stock dominating 
 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)   Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
Rural 
-0.1435** 
   
0.1726** 
  
(-1.99) 
   
(2.36) 
  
Top 10 distance  
-0.0406 
   
0.0283 
 
 
(-1.24) 
   
(0.71) 
 
Top 49 distance   
-0.1113** 
   
0.0948*** 
  
(-2.05) 
   
(2.60) 
Firm  size 
-0.0006 -0.0026 0.0002 
 
-0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0045 
(-0.02) (-0.11) (0.01) 
 
(-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.21) 
Return on assets 
0.0992 0.0946 0.0970 
 
-0.1495* -0.1439* -0.1459* 
(1.27) (0.90) (0.93) 
 
(-1.91) (-1.67) (-1.69) 
Tobin's Q 
0.0920** 0.0908* 0.0908* 
 
-0.1142** -0.1136*** -0.1131*** 
(2.38) (1.93) (1.92) 
 
(-2.15) (-2.65) (-2.60) 
Leverage 
-0.0428 -0.0410 -0.0426 
 
0.0988* 0.0975 0.0987 
(-0.67) (-0.48) (-0.50) 
 
(1.78) (0.96) (0.98) 
Cash 
0.1445 0.1487*** 0.1558*** 
 
-0.0695 -0.0787* -0.0832* 
(1.25) (2.69) (2.79) 
 
(-0.68) (-1.75) (-1.78) 
Rating missing 
-0.1085*** -0.1102** -0.1107** 
 
0.1026*** 0.1030* 0.1041* 
(-2.62) (-2.18) (-2.21) 
 
(2.78) (1.90) (1.91) 
Diversification 
0.0523 0.0497* 0.0503* 
 
-0.0445 -0.0423 -0.0424 
(1.35) (1.79) (1.84) 
 
(-1.04) (-1.30) (-1.31) 
Deal size 
-0.0193 -0.0195** -0.0193** 
 
0.0374*** 0.0377*** 0.0375*** 
(-1.35) (-2.31) (-2.30) 
 
(2.93) (2.95) (2.95) 
Private deal 
0.4364*** 0.4362*** 0.4349*** 
 
-0.5225*** -0.5222*** -0.5214*** 
(7.61) (7.08) (7.09) 
 
(-10.05) (-8.42) (-8.44) 
Tender offer 
1.3788*** 1.3817*** 1.3803*** 
 
-1.5101*** -1.5126*** -1.5116*** 
(11.62) (14.02) (14.06) 
 
(-19.24) (-14.22) (-14.30) 
Constant 
-0.2422** -0.2300* -0.2434** 
 
-0.0077 -0.0080 -0.0013 
(-2.09) (-1.94) (-1.97) 
 
(-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.01) 
        
Pseudo R2 0.0392 0.0390 0.0396 
 
0.0504 0.0499 0.0505 
Obs. 5334 5334 5334 
 
5334 5334 5334 
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Table 2. Probit regressions of payment methods on firm geographical location (continued) 
  Pure cash   Pure stock   Ordered payment 
 
Model (7) Model (8) Model (9)   Model (10) Model (11) Model (12)   Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) 
Rural  
-0.0916 
   
0.1697** 
   
-0.1292** 
  
(-0.95) 
   
(2.19) 
   
(-2.09) 
  
Top 10 distance  
0.0016 
   
0.0074 
   
-0.0037 
 
 
(0.05) 
   
(0.25) 
   
(-0.13) 
 
Top 49 distance   
-0.0616 
   
0.0638*** 
   
-0.0638** 
  
(-1.41) 
   
(2.79) 
   
(-2.48) 
Firm size 
0.0291 0.0306 0.0296 
 
0.0047 0.0027 0.0031 
 
0.0152 0.0167 0.0162 
(1.03) (1.05) (1.07) 
 
(0.16) (0.09) (0.10) 
 
(0.50) (0.85) (0.83) 
Return on assets 
0.1567* 0.1539* 0.1550* 
 
-0.1354* -0.1293* -0.1310* 
 
0.1427** 0.1388** 0.1399** 
(1.77) (1.79) (1.80) 
 
(-1.94) (-1.90) (-1.94) 
 
(2.07) (2.05) (2.07) 
Tobin's Q 
0.0657 0.0665 0.0654 
 
-0.0471 -0.0473 -0.0464 
 
0.0521 0.0521 0.0512 
(1.05) (1.08) (1.06) 
 
(-0.68) (-0.67) (-0.66) 
 
(1.61) (1.47) (1.43) 
Leverage 
0.0359 0.0336 0.0359 
 
-0.0962 -0.0961 -0.0959 
 
0.0559 0.0563 0.0555 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.44) 
 
(-0.98) (-1.00) (-0.99) 
 
(1.27) (0.85) (0.84) 
Cash  
0.0659 0.0734 0.0728 
 
-0.2190** -0.2319** -0.2330** 
 
0.1353 0.1458*** 0.1454*** 
(1.17) (1.30) (1.28) 
 
(-2.17) (-2.30) (-2.35) 
 
(1.41) (2.73) (2.70) 
Rating missing 
-0.0184 -0.0173 -0.0195 
 
0.0455 0.0442 0.0467 
 
-0.0297 -0.0287 -0.0307 
(-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.34) 
 
(0.53) (0.51) (0.53) 
 
(-0.93) (-0.60) (-0.63) 
Diversification 
0.0996*** 0.0990*** 0.0983*** 
 
-0.0342 -0.0329 -0.0324 
 
0.0700** 0.0691** 0.0686** 
(2.74) (2.76) (2.73) 
 
(-1.00) (-0.96) (-0.95) 
 
(2.08) (2.32) (2.30) 
Deal size 
-0.0380*** -0.0382*** -0.0380*** 
 
0.0277* 0.0280* 0.0278* 
 
-0.0322** -0.0324*** -0.0322*** 
(-5.61) (-5.72) (-5.69) 
 
(1.87) (1.89) (1.89) 
 
(-2.23) (-3.83) (-3.82) 
Private deal 
0.1609*** 0.1608*** 0.1598*** 
 
-0.5310*** -0.5307*** -0.5302*** 
 
0.3578*** 0.3577*** 0.3573*** 
(3.77) (3.79) (3.77) 
 
(-8.60) (-8.64) (-8.63) 
 
(6.49) (7.52) (7.52) 
Tender offer 
1.1028*** 1.1053*** 1.1039*** 
 
-1.2569*** -1.2606*** -1.2595*** 
 
1.2305*** 1.2337*** 1.2326*** 
(11.02) (11.09) (11.14) 
 
(-10.71) (-10.72) (-10.76) 
 
(17.91) (14.36) (-14.45) 
Constant 
-0.5737*** -0.5845*** -0.5751*** 
 
-0.2826 -0.2685 -0.2732 
    
(-4.06) (-4.04) (-4.01) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.40) (-1.39) 
    
            
Pseudo R2 0.0301 0.0299 0.0301 
 
0.0431 0.0424 0.0428 
 
0.0269 0.0266 0.0268 
Obs. 5334 5334 5334 
 
5334 5334 5334 
 
5334 5334 5334 
 
 
